Abstract On large networks security administration tasks such as patch management and event log analysis can take many hours and even days to successfully complete even with automated solutions. Currently it is left to the systems administrators' discretion to choose in which order to protect individual devices.
Introduction
In the modern world of always-on (24-7) business needs there is an increasingly inherent reliance of governments, large corporations and the public at large on Information Technology (IT) networks to carry out integral and critical tasks.
The security of such key networks has arisen as a major business and political issue. As described in [1] the damage caused by attacks on IT networks is very significant: network down time can result in disruption to vital business processes; repairing compromised devices can take weeks and consume excessive amounts of people resource; and loss of reputation can be hard to quantify but can potentially be the most significant cost.
It is argued that if the current trend of reducing time scales in exploitation and increasing number of software vulnerabilities continues as reported in [2] then, critical business processes will be exposed to unacceptably high levels of risk, even in the presence of automated security services such as path management as advocated in [3] . Therefore the efficient and effective utilisation of available security resources is required in order to further exploit their potential. This is highlighted in [4] where it is suggested that many organisations fail to gain real benefit from their investments in IT systems. Prioritisation of devices to receive security servicing is an approach, which may be used to enable this, reducing the time frame within which critical assets may be compromised; we call this time frame the Vulnerability Period (VP). The VP for each susceptible device is the time between a vulnerability first being reported to the time at which that device is made secure from such a vulnerability. The V P is defined as follows,
where P is the priority (integer value starting from '1', which is the highest priority) assigned to a given device, τ is the average time taken for a service to be successfully performed per device, τ is also variable due to differences in:
individual services, network latencies and dynamic characteristics of individual devices; K is the time taken for the developers to provide a solution to fix the vulnerability from the time of its discovery.
In [1] Brown et al. describe a pro-active malware susceptibility testing technique (Active Countermeasures), which applies a vaccine (a virus with a NULL payload) to devices on a network. An automated response is sent back from the device under investigation indicating its susceptibility to the virus and if a device is found to be susceptible it is immediately made safe. The scanning of individual devices is based upon a SETI@home-style [5] setup. Using this technique networks are separated into clusters of devices with each cluster being assigned to a given scanner for inspection purposes. However this process provides the service to devices in an arbitrary sequence. From equation 1 it can be seen how prioritisation unlike an arbitrary technique can aid the owners of devices to control the risk exposure to a given device by reducing or increasing its VP accordingly. Without prioritisation the VP can be any time between one and n (number of devices under consideration) times the average time (τ ) taken to service a single device.
The use of prioritisation to manage information security risks in IT networks is endorsed in [6] and [7] . In both of these papers the authors identify the requirement for determining the priority and therefore sequence in which individual devices receive security servicing. The question is how to develop a systematic technique for achieving such prioritisation? In [8] the authors introduce Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) a high-level strategy designed to identify the relative criticality of information and infrastructure assets. Although this methodology provides a valuable contextdriven systematic approach to managing information security risks, it does not directly address the issue of how one would technically achieve prioritisation and therefore control the risk exposure through the length of the VP for individual devices.
The application of security services such as automatic updating of anti-virus patching and signatures, security event log analysis as well as stateful (deep) packet analysis are a few examples of where a prioritisation capability could be employed as part of an overall quality of security service strategy, reducing the impact of potential compromises. For example in the case of deep packet analysis, the excessive overheads associated with scanning network communications as described in [9] means only a subset of the total traffic can be scanned.
Therefore a prioritisation technique would prove useful in differentiating between network traffic for analysis purposes, based upon its potential impact if it was to compromise the end-point(s).
Security services may also be significantly degraded if the infrastructure used to facilitate them is compromised and brought offline. This is particularly true if the resources (CPU time and communications bandwidth) of 'ordinary' devices on the network are required to enable such services, which is the case for the SETI@home-style setup used in the Hewlett Packard (HP) Active Countermeasures technique as described previously. It is argued that if a network was to use a security service(s) based upon such an architecture then the service(s)
would be severely affected if a worm such as Sasser [10] was to attack it, rapidly limiting available resources. In such a scenario a prioritisation technique would enable the scarce resources available to be focused at those devices perceived to be of greatest business value. This paper is organised as follows, section 2 describes a simple prioritisation strategy and highlights its limitations, section 3 details how connectivity in modern IT networks has evolved and how this has impacted the security risks, resulting in our investigation into compromise path analysis to quantify such risks, this is followed by an overview of how networks are modelled in this paper. In section 4 we specify and explain through an example, the algorithm developed to prioritise the order in which individual devices should receive security servicing. A brief overview of preliminary results from testing carried out on a software implementation of the algorithm is provided in section 5, with a summary and potential future work detailed in section 6.
A Simple Prioritisation Strategy
In order to develop any sort of information security risk strategy one must derive a security criticality classification system. This involves the identification and valuation of assets following which prioritisation can be derived, based upon the risks to those assets. Traditionally a classification system consists of a number of criticality levels, where individual devices are assigned to one such level.
There may be a different classification system for each of the three principle security properties of confidentiality, integrity and availability however, for the purposes of the modelling described in this paper we use only one classification system, which is analogous to that commonly used by many organisations for information security classifications. The criticality levels used in this system are (from high to low criticality): VH, H, M, L and S.
A simple prioritisation strategy for security purposes would be to order the application of security services based upon the criticality level to which a device is assigned, hence all devices with a criticality level of 'VH' would be assigned the highest priority for security service applications. However this may still result in a relatively arbitrary prioritisation of devices if there are a significant number of devices at the same criticality level in a network. This is illustrated in equation 2,
where it can be seen that as the total number of devices at the same criticality level in a network increases, the probability of any one device (P s ) receiving the appropriate prioritisation decreases. Therefore the probability of every device (P a ) receiving servicing in the correct order at any given criticality level can be defined as,
Equation 3 further highlights the limitations of an arbitrary servicing strategy when considering all devices at the same criticality level.
From equations 2 and 3 it is clear that in order to successfully prioritise, one requires a differentiating factor(s) between a set of devices at the same criticality level, otherwise the VP for assets will remain undetermined, where large numbers of devices are assigned to the same criticality level. One way of achieving such differentiation is to identify and analyse dynamic risks to individual devices and then prioritise the application of security services based upon these perceived risks. Numerous techniques such as: [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] and [15] exist for the identification, analysis and ranking (prioritisation) of risks in a network scenario. However a major limitation with all of these techniques is that they assume an exhaustive search of the problem space (i.e. identify individual risk(s) to device(s) and then quantify these based upon the attacker model), which can be vast and complex in the case of security vulnerabilities in modern IT networks.
In order to achieve our goal of pragmatic risk management it was decided to abstract from specific instances of threats, instead concentrating on perceived threats from other devices based upon their criticality level. The classification system used for the purposes of this work assumes that individual devices are assigned to a criticality level based upon the information and services they host.
In order to reduce security risks to devices with increasing criticality a number of assumptions have been made for the purposes of this model. Devices of increasing criticality are said to be:
• Accessed by authorised users in whom one has higher degrees of confidence
• More frequently monitored for abnormalities
• Given higher prioritisation for anti-malware purposes
Based upon the aforementioned assumptions the security risk associated with devices of increasing criticality are likely to decrease.
Evolving Risks in Evolving Networks
One of the major changes in computing networks over the last few years has been the ability to conveniently form agile business processes through paradigms can be seen that a much more complex and meshed environment is developing, where every device has the potential to become a gateway to external networks.
The complexity introduced by such extended connectivity adds to the threat vector in IT networks.
Although the business benefits of using a more a flexible approach to internetworking are clear the complexities introduced pose significant technical challenges, not least from a security point-of-view. One such challenge is to provide tailored security services according to the diverse needs of individual users and their devices as described by the Jericho forum [16] and their vision of deperimeterised security solutions. De-perimeterisation can already be seen to be taking place, where distributed or embedded firewalls are utilised on individual devices, supplementing the static and skeletal security model of the monolithic perimeter firewall solution.
Network Modelling
Throughout this paper we represent network connectivity as a graph G= D,C .
∀d ∈D, where d denotes a physical device and ∀c∈C, where c is an inter device compromise connection. We use semantic network modelling as described in [7] to represent compromise network connectivity, where a compromise connection (c) represents the potential to exploit a flaw(s) by one device in another therefore enabling the spread of malware such as viruses and worms. For example if a device hosts a particular web service application, which is subsequently found to have a flaw (e.g. buffer overflow) then all external devices authorised to access the application are then considered to have a compromise connection to the device hosting the vulnerable application. In [7] the author identifies the need to use either directed or un-directed edges with the added concept of attributes to provide further details on particular protocols (e.g. http, https) being run between devices. In our current model a simplified version of this is used, where all links between devices are undirected and attributes are not considered for simplicity.
A criticism of using such a model driven approach for the description of an 
Compromise Path Analysis
Although IP networking has the potential to allow ubiquitous connectivity, communications between devices are limited due to routing restrictions imposed by security services (e.g. embedded firewalls). This implies that if an attacker wants to compromise a given device(s) (victim) using a worm for example, then they must launch an attack from a device(s) which is authorised to connect to the victim otherwise the attempt to connect will be rejected. We call such compromise connections compromise paths, where a compromise path consists of one or a series of compromise connections as described in section 3.1. This implies that an attacker has to systematically traverse a number of devices and overcome various security barriers (defence in depth strategy) such as IP routing rules, traffic analysis and packet inspection to compromise a specific device in a specific manner.
The technique of compromise path analysis as adopted in this work is based upon that developed by QinetiQ for their Domain Based Security (DBSy) methodology [19] . To our knowledge there is no other strategy in the literature similar to compromise path analysis, which explicitly identifies the threat to a device based upon the graph theory concept of reachability. We use security criticalities to bound the search space, by only analysing for compromise connections to devices of equal or lower criticality, as they are deemed to pose the main risk. In the DBSy model, compromise paths are rated according to a technique analogous to table 1, this is part of a HMG infosec standard [20] , for quantifying risks when connecting devices of differing security criticalities.
Devices with a criticality of 'S' are not prioritised at all as they are believed to be out of the current administrative authorities control, they are only used as potential attackers in our compromise path analysis technique. Thus the set of devices in a network G which are prioritised (potential victim devices) is:
is unable to prioritise between them based upon security criticality levels (c r ) alone (i.e. they have the same criticality level), then the highest compromise path risk (p r ) associated with such devices may be used to distinguish between them. Where, ∀d ∈D s , devices with higher compromise path risk levels are given increased priority.
From table 1 it can be seen that a path between a device of 'VH' criticality and one of 'L' criticality has an associated risk level of '4', where a level '1' risk is 
Extending Compromise Path Risk Analysis
As well as using compromise path risk levels to distinguish between a set of devices as is described in the original method in [19] , our technique builds upon this by also using the concepts of compromise path length and residual risk. 
where ζ is the number of directly connected devices which have an equal or lower criticality level than the device (d), and v b is the connection risk level for such connections (c ∈ C) and is calculated by comparing the difference in criticality levels according to table 1 of the two devices in c · e s .
We quantify the risk to a device by assigning the four metrics described previously to attributes of each potential victim device d ∈ D M in the network G.
The attributes corresponding to each metric and in order of precedence are:
1. 
Specification of Algorithm
For the purposes of the algorithm to be described, we will define a number of terms to aid in its understanding. Our consolidated prioritisation technique is recursive and the algorithm is:
Although beyond the scope of this paper it must be noted that a number of limitations have been imposed upon the search algorithm to ensure it is computationally feasible, whilst providing a comprehensive analysis from a security point-of-view.
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Algorithm Execution
In order to illustrate the prioritisation strategy and the individual attribute values calculated by the algorithm when executed we have analysed the network given in figure 2 . It is assumed that the file, mail and web servers are remotely accessible using the Remote Desktop Protocol by administrator accounts, where currently those accounts are active on devices 'A', 'E' and 'B' as depicted in figure 3 . Numerous (i.e. B-D, K-I etc.) other devices are also connected using this protocol as can be seen from figure 3. However it is assumed that a flaw has been identified in a common application of this protocol, the connectivity due to this is represented as 'Compromise 1' edges in the graph in figure 3 , where the criticality level associated with a device is given in brackets. Another flaw allowing a Trojan Horse worm is then assumed to have been discovered affecting certain versions of both user and server operating systems; this is represented by the 'Compromise 2' connections (edges) in figure 3 . If considered simultaneously the connectivity due to the aforementioned compromises is as depicted in figure 3 , this is commonly the case with sophisticated worms which utilise numerous flaws or even if one decided to analyse a network for currently popular vulnerabilities.
The connections between devices B-Mail Server, F-D etc. depicted in figure   3 illustrate the fact that these devices are using the vulnerable version of the application running the Remote Desktop Protocol, and more importantly allow one another to utilise this application (i.e. firewall on device 'Mail Server' is configured to allow device 'B' to connect and utilise this service). Thus in the case of an attack if device 'B' is compromised it will be able to compromise the device 'Mail Server' even if 'Mail Server' has an embedded firewall enabled. 
Preliminary Experiment
The algorithm described in section 4 has been developed in a C#.NET software version called pfcca. The pfcca software requires an Extensible Markup Language (XML) file as input, which adheres to an XML Schema Definition describing devices and their associated compromise connectivity. However due to the time consuming nature of developing such XML input files by hand it was decided that automatic compromise connection network topology generation was required for preliminary testing. We developed a simulator named generator, which emulates the potential for compromise connections between devices using a theoretical attack model based upon that of the Blaster [21] worm and a localised connectivity strategy § as described in [23] . The details of the simulator are beyond the scope of this paper, however it is worth noting that well known power-law strategies [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] for IP network connectivity form the basis of our method, with a subset of this connectivity chosen to represent the potential for exploitation (compromise connectivity) using our theoretical attack. The generator application randomly assigns a criticality level to each device in a network, assigning higher criticality levels to critical nodes such as machines with administrator privileges for servers.
The theoretical attack emulated in the generator software is assumed to affect the majority of operating systems in use, allowing a remote attacker to gain To test the effectiveness of our strategy we ran 6 tests over pfcca with each test consisting of 100 networks (created by generator) of random sizes (ranging from 10 to 1000 nodes) and compromise connectivity. 
Experiment Analysis
From the results in table 4 it can be seen that approximately 99.13% of prioritisation decisions for the six tests (600 networks in total) were based upon one of the four attributes chosen. In comparison 0.87% of decisions could not be made using any of the four attributes. This highlights the usefulness of our consolidated prioritisation technique for successfully prioritising devices in a network. However this does not discount the possibility for further improvements or more efficient ways in which prioritisation could be achieved. The c r attribute produced no distinguishing results, this confirms our belief that criticality levels alone are not a suitable distinguishing metric for prioritisation in large networks (or where the number of devices is greater than the number of criticality levels) as discussed in section 2.
Conclusions & Future Work
It is believed that prioritisation of network security services is much needed in order to successfully protect critical IT assets, particularly as many networks are allowing more diverse and extended connectivity, which is resulting in increased security risks. It has been shown that security classifications alone, do not provide the required level of granularity upon which to base prioritisation decisions in large dynamic networks. Therefore we have developed a strategy based upon compromise path analysis to differentiate between devices, which are assigned to the same high-level static criticality level. Our technique considers dynamic risks from connected devices and quantifies the highest risk posed to any one device.
There are two cases in which even a prioritisation technique would be of limited use, firstly if an attacker has complete knowledge of the prioritisation technique as well as the criticality levels assigned to individual devices then they may target specific devices, to cause maximum impact. Related to this is the fact that an attacker may employ traffic analysis techniques to identify in which order and to what degree individual devices (or network segments) receive security services, thus potentially providing valuable information on the criticality of specific devices (or a group). Secondly it is acknowledged that although our prioritisation technique may limit the impact from malware such as CodeRed, Blaster and even Mydoom [29] it would have limited success in protecting against an extremely sophisticated theoretical attack known as a Flash worm as described in [23] . A Flash worm is able to accurately pre-compute the network addresses of susceptible devices, enabling it to spread through the entire Internet in seconds.
From preliminary testing the dynamic risk analysis technique for prioritisation described in this paper has delivered promising results, distinguishing between the vast majority (99.13%) of devices. Initial testing of the technique for large-scale real-world network topologies has also delivered encouraging results, however if this is to be done comprehensively then one would need to collate the necessary network topology semantics information and analyse this using a tool such as Nmap to identify potential compromise connectivity between devices. The development of an automated technique to achieve this is proposed as future work. Further work is also required in order to ascertain the effectiveness of the technique for different network topologies and criticality systems with varying levels. It is hoped that the VP can be used as a standard metric to compare the performance of differing techniques for the reduction of risk to critical assets in a network. 
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